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Abstract. This paper concerns “human symbolic output,” or strings of
characters produced by humans in our various symbolic systems; e.g., sen-
tences in a natural language, mathematical propositions, and so on. One
can form a set that consists of all of the strings of characters that have been
produced by at least one human up to any given moment in human history.
We argue that at any particular moment in human history, even at moments
in the distant future, this set is finite. But then, given fundamental results
in recursion theory, the set will also be recursive, recursively enumerable,
axiomatizable, and could be the output of a Turing machine. We then argue
that it is impossible to produce a string of symbols that humans could possi-
bly produce but no Turing machine could. Moreover, we show that any given
string of symbols that we could produce could also be the output of a Turing
machine. Our arguments have implications for Hilbert’s sixth problem and
the possibility of axiomatizing particular sciences, they undermine at least
two distinct arguments against the possibility of Artificial Intelligence, and
they entail that expert systems that are the equals of human experts are
possible, and so at least one of the goals of Artificial Intelligence can be
realized, at least in principle.
Keywords: Computability theory; Turing machines; axiomatization of sci-
ences; artificial intelligence
1. Human symbolic output
Consider the various symbolic systems humans have produced; e.g., the
natural languages such as English and Japanese; first-order logic; the
symbolic languages used in different areas of mathematics, or music, or
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in the various sciences such as physics. In other words, think of any
human symbolic system that has symbols and rules (or syntax) for how
those symbols can be combined into well-formed or meaningful strings
of characters. We produce these strings of characters constantly, e.g.,
any time we write down a grammatical sentence in a natural language,
or a mathematical claim, or an equation in Quantum Mechanics. At
any given moment in human history, there will be a set that consists
of all and only those strings of characters in a symbolic language that
at least one person has produced up to that moment. Call this set the
“ASO,” for “Actual Symbolic Output.” Again, the ASO will contain
every string of characters produced in any symbolic language up to a
given moment in human history; so, for instance, at the present moment,
the ASO will contain all strings of characters any one has ever produced
in natural language, mathematics, physics, music and so on up until now.
Of course, the cardinality of the ASO is continually growing larger with
each string of characters produced by a human in a symbolic language;
indeed, the cardinality of the ASO grows larger with each sentence we
finish while writing this paper. And also note that not every string
of characters in the ASO will correspond to a true claim; people often
produce false claims in natural language, mathematics, etc. Some of
these strings of characters might even lack a truth-value altogether. For
example, the score of Bach’s 5th Brandenburg Concerto is a string of
characters in a symbolic language, and so will be a member of the ASO;
but, it doesn’t appear to make sense to ask whether a string of musical
symbols is true or false. Moreover, one can think of various subsets of
the ASO; e.g., the ASO will contain the set of symbolic strings that have
been produced in English, as well as the set of symbolic strings that have
been produced in Japanese, or Quantum Mechanics, or Biochemistry,
and so on.1
1 There are some important and difficult questions involving the relationship
between the symbol strings we produce and human thought itself. For example, can
all human thoughts be encoded into a string of symbols or are some thoughts not
(even potentially) symbolic? This question appears related to a different question: is
thought necessarily linguistic or not? That is, must thoughts occur in a language?
Also, one might wonder if there is a sort of universal symbolic language that underlies
all of our particular symbolic systems, a sort of Mentalese (see [3])? These questions
are important, but in strictly focusing upon only the strings of characters that humans
output, we are trying to avoid them as much as possible. We can make the points we
wish to make in the absence of answers to these questions.
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Furthermore, one can posit a different set of character strings: the set
of symbolic strings that humans could produce. Call this set the “PSO,”
for “Possible Symbolic Output.” Of course, every string of characters
in the ASO will also be in the PSO; if a human has actually produced
a string of characters, then since we cannot do the impossible, it must
be possible for us to produce that string of characters. But the PSO
might very well contain strings of characters that we could produce but,
for whatever reason, never will; e.g., perhaps there is some massively
large addition problem that we are perfectly capable of producing, but
will never bother to produce? And finally, one can posit a third set of
character strings: the set of character strings that could be produced by a
Turing machine. Call this set the “TMO,” for “Turing machine output.”
In the remainder of this paper, we argue that there are various rela-
tionships between the ASO, PSO, and TMO. In section two, we argue
that the ASO is contained in the TMO; that is, at any given moment
in human history, the strings of characters in symbolic languages pro-
duced by humans up to that moment could all be produced by a Turing
machine, at least in principle. In other words, at least in practice, no
human mathematician, physicist or poet will ever produce a string of
characters that could not have been produced by a computer. In section
three, we argue that the PSO is also contained in the TMO; that is, any
string of characters in a symbolic system that could be produced by a
human could also be produced by a Turing machine. We conclude by
discussing some implications our claims have for attempts to axiomatize
physics and for the possibility of Artificial Intelligence.2
2. Actual symbolic output
Consider the ASO. Again, the ASO consists of all character strings in
any symbolic language that have been produced by at least one human
2 The arguments in this paper build on arguments made in a previous paper. In
[10], it is argued that any mathematical claim that humans will and could produce
could be the output of a Turing machine. However, while the arguments in that
paper focused solely on human mathematical output, here we attempt to generalize
those claims to any symbolic system, including natural languages and the symbolic
languages used in some sciences. This generates entirely novel implications involv-
ing, e.g., physics (as we discuss in section four). Moreover, some of the particular
arguments given in this paper are not in the previous paper (e.g., the argument from
mathematical induction to the claim that the ASO is finite that is given shortly).
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up to a given moment in human history. We first argue that at any
specific moment in human history, the ASO is (or was or will be) a set
with a finite cardinality.
Note the elementary fact that (i) even though the natural numbers
are countably infinite, any given natural number on the number line will
be finite, be it 576, 48721, 91013144043 and so on. Also note that one
can (ii) assign a natural number to every minute in human history in
which at least one human has (or will) produce a string of characters in
a symbolic language: label the first such minute “1,” the second “2,” and
so on, perhaps to infinity (if humanity lasts that long). Each minute in
human history will be assigned one and only one finite natural number.
So, (iii) at any particular moment in human history, there will only have
been a finite number of minutes  and so a finite amount of time  in
which humans have been producing character strings. But then, since
(iv) character strings take time to produce, (v) humans will have only
produced a finite number of character strings at any given moment in
human history.3
If one finds the previous argument questionable, for whatever reason,
here is a second argument: (i) pick a random minute m in human his-
tory. For example, minute 1115678490, though it does not matter which
minute we pick. Call this minute our “base case.” Clearly, (ii) at this
minute, there will have been (up to and including that minute) a finite
number of people producing a finite number of symbolic strings. But
also note that the same will be true of the next minute, i.e., of minute
1115678490 + 1. So, (iii) at minute 1115678490 + 1, there will also have
been (up to and including that minute) only a finite number of people
producing a finite number of symbolic strings. (iii) is true because in the
minute that passes from 1115678490 to 1115678490 + 1, there will be a
finite number of people producing a finite number of symbolic strings;
call the number of strings produced in that minute “n.” The number of
strings produced up to and including 1115678490+1 will be the number
of strings produced up to and including 1115678490 (a finite number)
plus n (also a finite number), and so will be finite as well. Therefore, by
mathematical induction, we can infer that, (iv) at any minute m through-
3 The above argument seems unproblematic: (i) is a basic fact mathematical fact;
(ii) is an innocuous numbering of minutes with natural numbers; (iii) follows from (i)
and (ii); (iv) is a simple fact about the production of symbolic strings; and (v) follows
from (iii) and (iv).
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out human history, the total number of symbolic strings produced up to
and including that point is finite.
We have seen that at any particular minute in human history, the
set ASO of human symbolic strings that have been produced up to and
including that minute is finite. The ASO will have members that are
simply strings of characters; these characters might be letters from al-
phabets in natural languages, or characters used in mathematics, or
symbols used in physics and so on. And again, this list  though always
changing as people continue to produce new symbolic strings will al-
ways be finite at any particular moment. This will be true even if human
history stretches infinitely into the future: just as any particular natural
number will be finite even though the number of natural numbers is
countably infinite, the amount of time between the first human symbolic
string produced and any particular (later) minute in human history will
be finite, even if humans will produce symbolic strings for a countably
infinite number of minutes. Furthermore, trivially, any particular human
that will ever exist will exist in one or more of these particular minutes:
there will never be a human that can “look backwards” at a countably
infinite number of symbolic strings.
Given that at any particular minute in human history, the set ASO
will be finite, then since finite sets are recursive, the ASO will be re-
cursive too. So, for instance, one can  at least in principle  devise an
algorithm that could determine whether or not some random string of
characters is in the ASO (at any given moment). Consider some random
string of characters. Check the first member of the ASO to see if this
random string of characters and this string of characters in the ASO are
the same. If the strings are the same, then output a 1 and stop. If they
are not the same, then move on to the next member of the ASO; again,
if the strings match, output a 1, and if they do not, then move on to the
next member of the ASO to see if this member matches the string. One
of two things will happen: we will eventually get a match (and so a value
of “1”), or we will go to the end of the finite list without finding a match
(in which case, output a value of “0”). We can take a certain input (a
random string of characters), and then use an algorithm to determine
if this string is or is not in the ASO. So the ASO is recursive.4 And
4 See, e.g., [14]. Basically, (where n = a random string of characters), since there
is an algorithm that returns the value 1 ↔ n ∈ ASO and the value 0 ↔ n /∈ ASO, the
ASO is recursive.
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note again that the ASO is a fairly interesting set. By definition, all of
the symbolic strings that any human will ever produce will eventually
be in the ASO; a symbolic string produced by a human at some point in
human history will automatically become a member of the ASO when
it is produced. By definition, we will never produce a symbolic string
not in the ASO, because as soon as a string is produced, it automati-
cally becomes a member of the ASO. So, human symbolic output at any
particular moment in time, as we know it and as we will always know it,
will always be recursive.
But if so, then a number of claims about actual human symbolic
output are true. For example, since recursive sets are recursively enu-
merable, the sum total of human symbolic output at any particular mo-
ment throughout human history will always be recursively enumerable
(see, e.g., Wang [14]). Furthermore, since recursively enumerable sets
are axiomatizable (see [2]), actual human symbolic output will always
be axiomatizable. Indeed, since this set will always be finite at any
particular moment, it will be finitely axiomatizable. Moreover, the sum
total of actual human symbolic output could be the output of a Turing
machine. In other words, a Turing machine could produce as output any
symbolic output that humans have ever and will ever produce.5 The
ASO is contained in the TMO.
3. Possible symbolic output
But now consider the set PSO, the set of all character strings that hu-
mans could possibly produce. Whereas the set ASO is finite at any partic-
ular moment in human history, the PSO is almost certainly (countably)
infinite. A human could produce the character string “1 + 1 = 2,” and
“2 + 1 = 3,” and “3 + 1 = 4,” and so on ad infinitum. Nevertheless, the
PSO still might be recursive, and so recursively enumerable, axiomatiz-
able, and Turing computable; some infinite sets are recursive (e.g., the
natural numbers, the prime numbers etc).
Whether or not the PSO is recursive, it is impossible for us to produce
a specific string of characters that could not be the output of a Turing
5 Note that a set is recursively enumerable if and only if a program exists that
will give the members and only the members of the set as output (see, e.g., [14]).
We have already seen that the ASO is recursively enumerable, so there must be a
program for producing only the members of the ASO.
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machine. Consider three sets. (1) The set ASO of symbolic strings
humans actually will produce at some point in human history. (2) The
set PSO of symbolic strings that humans could possibly produce. And
(3) the set TMO of symbolic strings that a Turing machine could possibly
produce. Above, we saw that a Turing machine could produce as output
all of the strings in the ASO (as it exists at any given moment throughout
human history); so the ASO is contained in the TMO. So, if there is
a symbolic string that humans could possibly produce but no Turing
machine could, or if there is a string of characters that is in the PSO
but not the TMO, this string must be in the PSO though not in the
ASO, for if it was in the ASO, then it would be in the TMO as well.
But we will forever be unable to actually produce this string; for if we
could produce it, then it would be in the ASO (since the ASO is the
set of symbolic strings humans will produce), and so in the TMO as
well (and so could not be used as a counterexample to mechanism).
To reformulate the argument, suppose that we can produce a character
string that humans can produce but no Turing machine could; indeed,
we can produce this counterexample to mechanism. We could, e.g., write
this string of characters on a chalkboard and proclaim mechanism dead.
So, this string is in the ASO, and so also the PSO, but not the TMO. But
we saw above that every character string that humans will ever actually
produce could also be produced by a Turing machine; any string in the
ASO is also in the TMO. So this string both is and is not in the TMO.
The assumption that we can produce a character string that can falsify
mechanism entails a contradiction; so we cannot produce a particular
counterexample to mechanism. We cannot produce an example of a
character string that could not be the output of a Turing machine.
Moreover, it appears that one can establish a stronger claim: one can
show that any particular symbolic string that is in the PSO is also in the
TMO. Consider the set ASO of actual human symbolic strings produced
up to a given moment in human history and the set PSO of symbolic
strings humans could possibly produce. As mentioned above, the ASO
is a subset of the PSO. If a human has produced a given symbolic string
at some point, and so this string is in theASO, then it must be possible
for a human to produce that string, and so this string is in the PSO.
Furthermore, there will either be (a) at least one string that is in the
PSO but not in the ASO or (b) not; this is an instance of excluded
middle. If (b) not, then since the ASO is recursive (see above), the PSO
will be recursive  and so computable  as well. But if (a), then the
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PSO contains more strings than the ASO. Call the set of these strings
that are in the PSO but not in the ASO the “USO,” for “Unproduced
Symbolic Output.” The USO contains producible strings (again, they
are in the PSO) that will  for whatever reason  forever remain unpro-
duced. Now, consider a random string in the USO. It appears that this
string could be in the ASO. After all, this string is possibly producible
by definition (it is in the PSO), and the ASO is the set of those strings
that we will produce; so clearly, this string at least could be in the ASO.
But then any given individual string in the USO could have been in the
ASO; with general conditional proof, if any random member of the USO
could be in the ASO, then any given member of the USO could be in
the ASO. But then any member of the PSO could be in the ASO, since
the PSO will simply be the union of the ASO and the USO. And since
a Turing machine can produce the set ASO as output (see above), it
should be able to produce any string that is in the PSO as output as
well. Any particular symbolic string that we could produce could be
produced by a Turing machine. A Turing machine  not only in practice
but even in theory  could produce any given human symbolic output.
4. Implications
We’ve argued that at any given moment in human history, the set ASO
of symbolic strings that humans will have produced up to and including
that moment is (i) finite, (ii) recursive, (iii) recursively enumerable, (iv)
axiomatizable, and (v) could be the output of a Turing machine. Further-
more, the set PSO of symbolic strings that humans could possibly pro-
duce is such that (vi) we can never produce a specific member of the PSO
that cannot be the output of a Turing machine and indeed, (vii) any spe-
cific member of the PSO is computable, at least insofar as any given sym-
bolic string we could produce could be the output of a Turing machine.
We conclude by briefly discussing some implications of these claims.
First, the arguments have implications for Hilbert’s sixth problem,
or at least a variant of it. Famously, in a lecture delivered at the Interna-
tional Congress of Mathematicians in Paris in 1900, the mathematician
David Hilbert gave a list of 23 great unsolved problems in mathematics.
One of these problems, the sixth, dealt with the axiomatization of cer-
tain areas of physics; Hilbert [6] wished “to treat. . . , by means of axioms,
those physical sciences in which mathematics plays an important part.”
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Corry [1] claims that the sixth problem has often been seen as an odd
inclusion in Hilbert’s list of 23 problems; to many, the sixth problem
doesn’t appear to be like the other problems on the list.6 Corry [1]
claims that
Thus, in reports occasionally written about the current state of research
on the twenty-three problems, the special status of the sixth problem
is readily visible: not only has it been difficult to decide to what extent
the problem was actually solved (or not), but one gets the impression
that, of all the problems on the list, this one received the least attention
from mathematicians throughout the century and that relatively little
effort was directed at solving it ([5] and [15]).
Nevertheless, if the argument in section two is correct, it does appear
that areas of physics can be axiomatized, at least in principle. Consider
the set of claims in a particular branch of physics  understood as strings
of symbols in the relevant notation  that humans have produced at any
given moment in human history. This set will be finite: it is a subset of
a finite set (the ASO) and so must be finite itself. But if so, then it will
be recursive, recursively enumerable and axiomatizable. That is, the set
of claims in any branch of physics  as it exists at any given moment in
human history, and so as it exists in the only way we will ever know it 
can be axiomatized, at least in principle. And the same will hold for all
sciences that employ symbolic systems.
Second, the arguments above have implications for the possibility
of Artificial Intelligence. For instance, there are extant arguments that
machine intelligence will forever fall short of human intelligence. The
Lucas-Penrose argument is one example (see [7, 8, 9]; see also [11, 12]).
The Lucas-Penrose argument posits a mathematical claim that we can
see is true, a Gödel sentence (see [4]), but no Turing machine could; it
posits a mathematical claim that we can produce but no Turing machine
could. But clearly if a Turing machine can produce any symbolic claim
that we can, we cannot produce a mathematical claim that a Turing
machine could not.7 But this point can be generalized to apply to strings
produced in any symbolic system. For example, sometimes people claim
that since computers “lack creativity,” any machine intelligence will fall
6 Though Corry himself rejects this view and argues that Hilbert’s sixth problem
is a natural outgrowth of Hilbert’s work on and conception of axiomatic systems etc.
7 See [11] for more on what our arguments imply about human mathematical
output specifically.
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short of human intelligence in at least one important respect. But if
our arguments are correct, then any musical score, novel, poem, etc.
that we can produce could be produced by a Turing machine as well.
Musical scores, novels, etc. are simply strings of characters in symbolic
languages, and a Turing machine can produce any string of characters
that we will or even could produce.
Third, the arguments above provide some evidence that expert sys-
tems that are the equals of human experts are possible, and so at least
one of the goals of Artificial Intelligence is realizable in principle. Of
course, in A.I., an expert system is a machine intelligence that can rea-
son like a human expert in one specific domain or area of discourse,
whatever it might be. And if the arguments above are correct, it should
be possible to construct expert systems that are just as competent as
humans in a variety of areas; e.g., it is at least theoretically possible to
produce an expert system in, say, mathematics, that could match Gauss
theorem for theorem. Recall that the ASO is a finite set. The strings of
characters that correspond to human output in a particular discipline,
e.g. physics or mathematics, will be contained in the ASO, and so they
will be finite in number as well; again, a subset of a finite set must
be finite. But then all of these subsets that correspond to particular
disciplines will be recursive, recursively enumerable, axiomatizable and
Turing computable.8
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